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THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S
ANTIDEGRADATION POLICY:
HAS IT BEEN "DUMPED"?
KATHERINE A. ZOGAS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"BP gets break on dumping in lake" is what the headline of
the paper read on July 15, 2007.1 "BP" was British Petroleum
America ("BP"), the "lake" was Lake Michigan, and the "dumping"
was of pollutants. 2 Lake Michigan is the largest body of fresh
water that rests completely within the U.S.3 It provides drinking
water for six million people in Northeast Illinois and provides
recreation for citizens of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and
Michigan. 4 BP sought to have its National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit renewed so that it could
increase its refinery discharges into the Lake in contemplation of
expanding its oil refinery in Whiting, Indiana. 5 The newspaper
headline was simply a sign of the times. The "break" given to BP
reminded the public that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
more commonly known as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), was still
6
very much a part of the times.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The John Marshall Law School. The author
would like to thank her parents for their exceptional support throughout the
development of this Comment. Thank you also to Daniel Saeedi, Joe Rose,
and Anthony Zogas.
1. Michael Hawthorne, BP Gets Break on Dumping in Lake, CHI. TRIB.,
July 15, 2007, § 1, at 1. This article was the first of many to appear, notifying
the greater public that Indiana had just renewed BP's National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit. The permit was renewed because, in
part, BP's planned oil refinery expansion would create eighty new jobs and
provide security and diversity of oil supplies. Id.
2. Id.
3. Ill. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.state.il.us/water/surfacewater/lake-michigan-mon.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
4. Id.
5. Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 1; see Posting of BP Products North
America, Inc., Whiting Refinery NPDES Permit No. IN 0000108 to IDEM
[hereinafter
BP Permit]
(on
file
with
author),
available at
http://www.in.gov/idem/5338.htm#BP (detailing the limitations on pollutants
that may lawfully be discharged by BP under this permit as approved by the
Indiana Department of Environmental Management).
6. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
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Congress' stated goal in implementing the CWA over thirty
years ago, to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters[,]" was a grand one. 7 A
further national goal of the CWA was that the discharge of
pollutants into the U.S.'s navigable waters would be eliminated as
early as 1985.8 Today, such goals remain distinguished and yet
elusive. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
the States are charged with implementing and ensuring
compliance with the CWA. 9 The cooperation expected between the
EPA and States under the CWA has been a source of concern. 10
The national attention BP has received recently over the
application for a renewal of its NPDES permit has highlighted the
extent of EPA-State cooperation under the CWA. 11 It has also
highlighted another major CWA policy: antidegradation. 12 When

7. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

8. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

10. See Michael Hawthorne, BP to Reconsider Permit on Refinery: Move
Follows Outcry over Lake Pollution,CHI. TRIB., Aug. 16, 2007, at 1 (noting that
Federal and State regulators asserted they did not have legal authority to
rescind BP's recently renewed permit in response to a "groundswell of protests
from politicians and the public"); see also Rebecca Berfanger, Refinery Permit
Finalized; What IDEM, BP, Environmentalists Have to Say on Legal Issues,
THE IND. LAw., Aug. 8, 2007, at 1, (noting, in response to the public attention
given the situation, that a BP spokesperson said both Indiana and the EPA
But see Jerome M. Organ,
found BP's renewed permit satisfactory).
Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards
More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and
Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1995) (explaining that
Congress desired that cooperation between the federal and State governments
be a major component of the new legislation so that environmental regulation
could be experimental in nature).
Although many cast doubt upon the feasibility of cooperation between the
EPA and States, this method of enforcement was an attempt to revise a flawed
State-regulated pollution control system. The water quality-based approach
used prior to 1972, "provided incentives for states to use less restrictive
pollution control criteria to attract economic development by 'pollution
shopping' industries." Mark C. Van Putten & Bradley D. Jackson, The
Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 863, 871 (1986).
The States used scientific uncertainties to manipulate the requirements for
individual industries. Id. at 871-72.
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b); see Michael Hawthorne, EPA Will Ask BP to Offset
Pollution, CHI. TRIB., August 15, 2007, at 1 (emphasizing the EPA's continual
insistence that it could not stop BP from lawfully dumping more pollutants
into Lake Michigan under the NPDES permit issued to BP by Indiana).
12. See Environmental Protection Agency Water Quality Standards Rule,
40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2008) (setting the minimum requirements states must
adopt under the antidegradation policy); Van Putten & Jackson, supra note
10, at 895 (explaining that the antidegradation policy was never explicitly
ratified by the CWA's statutory language nor explicitly approved in the
legislative history of amendments to the CWA, though "Congress apparently
knew of the policy's existence and implicitly ratified it in the [CWA's] goal[s]").
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the EPA and States enable each other to deviate from the CWA,
what recourse does the public have?
Part II will illustrate the history of the CWA, its expectation
of cooperation between the EPA and the States, and its
antidegradation policy contained in the NPDES permit program.
Part III will examine the way in which the antidegradation policy
and the Indiana Administrative Code have worked together to
allow BP to increase pollutant discharges into Lake Michigan in
spite of public disapproval. Finally, Part IV will propose a new
balancing approach to ensure dedication to the essence of the
CWA.

II. THE CWA's EVOLUTION
A. Social Conscience, Implementation, and Cooperation
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 following an ever13
increasing public outcry over the condition of the nation's waters.
The "most dramatic alarm rang" when a river, full of oil and
industrial waste, burst into flames in Ohio.14
However, in
enacting the CWA, Congress did not just respond to the public and
such disquieting events; it also acknowledged its own failure with
previous measures it had taken to reduce water pollution. 15 The
time had come 16 for Congress to accept the present state of affairs

13. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2007); see ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C.
LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 5-6
(1993) (illustrating the public's heightened awareness of the critical situation
involving water pollution in the U.S. by listing the numerous reports of
polluted waters and contaminated fish); THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 1,
5-7 (Mark A. Ryan ed., A.B.A. 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter CWA HANDBOOK]
(illustrating the legislative history of the CWA).
14. ADLER, supra note 13, at 5.
15. See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation:
The
Congressional Prescription for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean
Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 202 (1987) (noting that Congress had
found, to its alarm, that industries and cities were using the Nation's waters
as "convenient disposal site[s]" for continually increasing amounts of garbage
even though pollution controls were in place); Van Putten & Jackson, supra
note 10, at 867 (explaining that the CWA came about because of Congress's
twenty-five year experience with unsuccessful attempts to control federal and
state water pollution).
16. Interestingly, pollution legislation from as early as 1899 was still in
effect to some degree. Kenneth M. Murchison, Learningfrom More than Fiveand-a-Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty
Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 529 (2005). The
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, a precursor to modern water
pollution control legislation, had been a force in the twentieth century creation
of the CWA. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1121
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (2002)). The CWA's NPDES
permit program served to supplement as well as replace the Rivers and
Harbors Act's permit program. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 6.
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as a "cancer" that could no longer be ignored. 17
The implementation of the CWA meant a new approach to
mitigating water pollution.
Rather than confine the
implementation of the CWA to the EPA, Congress explicitly
recognized the States as having the primary responsibility for the
success of this new legislation.18 Congress further expressed that
its policy under the CWA was to recognize the "rights of States to
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution."'19 In other words,
Congress had determined that cooperation between the EPA and
the States was not only desirable, but necessary. 20 Congress also
took it one step further and expressly called for public
participation in the implementation of the CWA.21
Although the States had been informed of their numerous
responsibilities under the CWA, the EPA retained a vast amount
of its own responsibilities. In connection with this new emphasis
on EPA-State cooperation, the EPA had the continuing obligation
to provide guidance to the States regarding pollutants that posed
risks to the health of humans and wildlife. 22 This aspect of the
EPA's role under the CWA remains unchanged today and is just as
23
important as it was at the time the CWA was enacted.

17. ADLER, supra note 13, at 7. In 1972, Senator Ed Muskie tried to
persuade his fellow senators to pass the 1972 CWA by stating, "[tihe cancer of
water pollution was engendered by our abuse of our lakes, streams, rivers and
oceans; it has thrived on our half-hearted attempts to control it; and like any
other disease, it can kill us." Id.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g); see also D.C. v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 860 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (explaining that the CWA itself and its legislative history reflect
Congress's desire to put the regulatory burden on the States while the EPA
would retain broad discretion in administering the CWA); Prairie Rivers
Network v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 781 N.E.2d 372, 377 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(emphasizing that "[a]lthough the administration and enforcement of the
permit program initially was vested entirely in the US EPA, Congress
intended that much of this authority would devolve to the states.").
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(6); ADLER, supra note 13, at 120.
23. In that designated role, the EPA has published the Water Quality
Standards Handbook ("Handbook"). U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK INT-1 (Government Institutes 2d ed.
1995)(1983) [hereinafter EPA HANDBOOK]. As its name suggests, the EPA
Handbook provides a detailed explanation of terminology used in the CWA as
well as the ways in which a State can transform that terminology into
meaningful guidelines. Id. at 3-1, 3-16. The EPA Handbook includes a
glossary, flow charts, and cross-references between the various provisions of
the CWA and provides even more specific guidance through documents found
in the appendices. Id. at GLOSS-i, 3-7, A-1. For purposes of this Comment,
Chapter Three of the Handbook is significant as it provides an in-depth
analysis of "water quality criteria." Id. at 3-1.
Additionally, the U.S. EPA continually promulgates water quality criteria
guidance on its website. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Introduction
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The "impetus" 24 for the CWA in 1972-water pollution levels
dangerous to humans and wildlife alike-does not exist in the
same form today. Neither can it be said that the EPA and States
have ceased to cooperate under the CWA. And yet, pollution of the
U.S. waters continues, public outcry against it is once more on the
rise, and EPA-State interaction (so far as BP is concerned) permits
increased
pollutant discharges
into Lake
Michigan. An
explanation of the NPDES permit program, therefore, is necessary
to understand the present state of affairs.
B. AntidegradationPolicy Accepts Degradation
The most significant part of the CWA, in terms of EPA-State
cooperation, appears in Section 1342, which provides for the
NPDES permit program. 25 The permit program, in its most basic
terms, sets limits for individual pollutant dischargers,2 6 such as
BP.
These individual pollutant dischargers must ensure
compliance with the CWA.27 The issuance of an NPDES permit to
an individual discharger is best understood as a stamp of approval
from both the EPA and an individual State that the discharger has
acknowledged limits within which it may act to comply with the
CWA.28

While the NPDES permit program highlights the cooperation
between the EPA and individual States under the CWA, it serves
an even more important role. The NPDES permit program
translates water quality standards (required of each State for their
various bodies of water) into effective controls on the amount of

to the CWA, http://www.epa.gov/watertrain/cwa/ (last visited on Nov. 2, 2008).
States rely upon the EPA's guidance in setting their own water quality
criteria. ADLER, supra note 13, at 120. Where States fail to implement such
standards, the EPA must do so. Id.
24. ADLER, supra note 13, at 5.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
26. See CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 9-14 (summarizing the various
definitions of terms found in CWA section 1342 in order to fully understand
that section of the NPDES permit program).
CWA "defines the term
'discharge of a pollutant' to mean 'any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source."' Id. at 10. The CWA Handbook provides that
in order to understand the CWA definition, other terms must be defined

further. Id.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1342; see Andreen, supra note 15, at 204 ("The [NPDES]
permit transforms generally applicable effluent limitations and other
standards into enforceable obligations of the individual discharger.").
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) ("[T]he [EPA] Administrator may... issue a
permit for the discharge of any pollutant.., upon condition that such
discharge will meet.., all applicable requirements under [this Act]."); see also

Andreen, supra note 15, at 204 (summarizing the NPDES permit program and
concluding that an NPDES permit defines compliance with the CWA for
dischargers and makes the job of government enforcement easier).
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pollution "person[s]" 29 can discharge into "navigable"30 waters. 31
In other words, NPDES permits set standards for compliance with
effluent limitations, 32 and consequently, compliance with the
CWA.
The NPDES permit program is arguably the CWA's
strongest attribute. 33 However, even this program is not without
34
its detractors.
BP, planning a considerable expansion of its oil refinery in
Whiting, Indiana, 35 and facing the expiration of its previous
NPDES permit, necessarily had to comply with CWA
requirements in attaining a renewed NPDES permit. 36 BP applied
to the Indiana Department of Environmental Management
("IDEM") because the State of Indiana, and specifically IDEM,
were delegated the authority to implement the NPDES permit
37
program within Indiana.

29. 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
31. See EPA Administered Permit Programs: The National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2008) (defining
"waters," in one way, as those waters currently used, were used or may be
used for interstate commerce); see also Posting of BP Products North America,
Inc. Whiting Refinery Fact Sheet to IDEM, March 2007 [hereinafter BP Fact
Sheet] (on file with author), available at http://www.in.gov/idem/5338.htm#BP
(identifying Lake Michigan for purposes of BP's NPDES permit application).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1311; 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
33. See Andreen, supra note 15, at 204 (noting that the EPA
Administrator's awareness of NPDES permit violations makes it easier to take
"quick, effective action to obtain compliance" with the CWA). Contra ADLER,
supra note 13, at 150-66 (detailing the NPDES permit program's numerous
deficiencies).
34. See ADLER, supra note 13, at 158 (explaining that expired NPDES
permits have been a continual problem for the program and therefore a barrier
to the ultimate accomplishment of "zero discharge" under the CWA). States
often operate in much the same way as the EPA does, in issuing NPDES
permits and then allowing for automatic extension of a permit's effective
period. Id. Actually, BP's current permit had expired on February 28, 1995.
BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 1. That permit had been "administratively
extended due to [BP's] submittal of a timely renewal application in accordance
with 327 LAC 5-2." Id. This automatic extension possibility translates into
facilities continuing to discharge without repercussion though their permits
are years passed original expiration. ADLER, supra note 13, at 158. Permits
are further weakened by the option of renewal or reissuance. Id. BP sought
renewal of its NPDES permit originally issued in March 1990. BP Fact Sheet,
supra note 31, at 1.
35. Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 1.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1311; 33 U.S.C. § 1362; see also BP Fact Sheet, supra note
31, at 1 (explaining BP's application for renewal of its NPDES permit
following the decision to modify its refinery).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-15-1-2 (West 2007); see also
Johnson County Citizen Comm. for Clean Air & Water v. United States EPA,
No. 3:05-0222, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33190, at *3-4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 9,
2005) (explaining that the EPA's role becomes supervisory once a State has
been granted NPDES permitting authority, though the State must still comply
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In being granted the authority to implement the NPDES
permit program, the State of Indiana was required to prove that it
had promulgated water quality standards 38 so that effluent
limitations could be met accordingly. 39 Water quality standards
40
are laws or regulations that consist of three necessary elements.
The Indiana Administrative Code provides the three elements: (1)
setting forth the designated use of each of its water bodies; (2) the
water quality criteria necessary to protect those uses; and (3) an
41
antidegradation statement.
The antidegradation statement is standard language provided
by the Code of Federal Regulations. 42 The exception, allowing for
degradation, is contained within it.
In relevant part, the
regulation reads, "[w]here the quality of the waters exceed levels
necessary to support propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
recreation in and on the water, that quality shall be maintained
and protected unless the State finds, . . . that allowing lower water
quality is necessary to accommodate important economic or social

development..

....
-43

States that have been granted approval by

the EPA to administer their own NPDES permit programs have

with federal standards); Prairie Rivers Network, 781 N.E.2d at 380 (noting
that EPA approval of a State's NPDES permit program does not mean the
State directly administers the CWA, but does mean the State has
demonstrated to the EPA's satisfaction that its program fulfills the statutory
requirements and guidelines of the CWA).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
40. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 26 (setting forth the three necessary
elements). Each of the necessary elements of a water quality standard relate
to different sections of the CWA. Id. at 27-30; see also Water Quality
Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (setting forth six requirements for water quality
standards submission). The obligation States have to implement water quality
standards that include individual parts of the CWA reiterates that States do
not directly administer the CWA, but simply meet its requirements. Prairie
Rivers Network, 781 N.E.2d at 380. Furthermore, this relationship between
State NPDES permit programs, the EPA, and the CWA reiterates the CWA's
focus on EPA-State cooperation. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text
(discussing the states' responsibility to enforce the CWA).
41. 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1-2 (2007); 40 C.F.R. § 131.12; see also CWA
HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 26-32 (providing further analysis of those
necessary elements). It is important to distinguish the CWA's antidegradation
policy from its "antibacksliding" provision. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o). The latter
was added to the CWA by Congress in 1987 to constrain the weakening of
permits absent narrow exceptions.
ADLER, supra note 13, at 158.
Antibacksliding involves a change in effluent limitations provided in
individual NPDES permits, while the antidegradation policy involves changes
in ambient water quality. Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 10, at 895.
Furthermore, "the antidegradation policy applies to new as well as existing
pollutant discharge sources, whereas the antibacksliding [provision] applies
only to existing permitted sources." Id.
42. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.
43. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2).
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all included the same or similar boilerplate language in varying
forms.

44

The Code of Federal Regulations rates water according to a.
three-tier system, which protects against antidegradation. 45 The
exception contained within the antidegradation policy, recognizes
economic and social development.
This exception applies
specifically to waters classified as "Tier II."46 Yet, Lake Michigan,
where BP sought to discharge increased amounts of pollutants is
classified as "Tier III." 4 7 However, IDEM applied this exception to
Lake Michigan. 48 When a high quality water is classified as Tier
II, a State can issue or renew an NPDES permit even if the
effluent limitations set in the individual discharger's permit are
not as strict as would otherwise be required by the CWA. 49 The
water quality standards that would have otherwise been required
of BP in its application for a renewed NPDES permit appear
50
similar to that of a neighboring State's criteria.
44. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 302.105 (2007) (setting forth its
antidegradation policy); 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1-2 (outlining the policy for
"nondegredation" of surface water); MICH. ADMIN CODE r. 323.1098 (2007)
(laying out the state's antidegredation policy); Wis. ADMIN. CODE NR § 102.05
(2007) (explaining the state's antidegredation policy).
45. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12. "Tier I" provides that "[e]xisting instream water
uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall
be maintained and protected." Id. "Tier II" waters are "high quality" waters
or those that "exceed levels necessary to support propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife and recreation in and on the water .. " Id. "Tier III" provides
that "[wihere high quality waters constitute an outstanding National resource,
such as waters of National and State parks and wildlife refuges and waters of
exceptional recreational or ecological significance, that water quality shall be
maintained and protected." Id.
46. Id. The Indiana Administrative Code Section 2-1-2 mirrors the federal
tiers, but as to Indiana's "Tier III" waters, specific waters within the State are
designated, including Lake Michigan. 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1-2. When
there is a possibility of degradation, a State must provide an opportunity for
public and intergovernmental participation in determining whether to allow
the degradation. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12; 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1-2; CWA
HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 32. The proposed activity providing for possible
degradation may nevertheless be approved if the State can offer "substantial
and convincing justification." CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 32.
47. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 2 (explaining that Lake Michigan is an
outstanding state resource water, or "Tier III" water body); see supra note 45
(stating the definition of "Tier III" waters). The Indiana Administrative Code
provides an additional amount of protection and imposes additional
requirements when it comes to Lake Michigan. See, 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 21.5-4 (2007) (explaining the antidegradation policy as it applies to the Great
Lakes system in particular).
48. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 16-17.
Compare 40 C.F.R.
§ 131.12(a)(2), with 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3) (explaining the differences
between Tier II and Tier III water quality).
49. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.
50. Compare 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1.5-8-6 (2007) (setting surface water
quality criteria for the protection of human health, for mercury and benzene
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In its application for NPDES permit renewal, BP explained
that it had plans to update its facility in Whiting, Indiana. 51 Along
with that renovation would come an increase in size and a need to
52
discharge an increased amount of pollutants into Lake Michigan.
As Indiana State officials explained, an increase in pollutant
discharge would bring with it an increase in both temporary and
53
permanent jobs for the people of the surrounding community.
Because this justification fell within the exception to the
antidegradation policy of the CWA, 54 BP succeeded in getting a
renewed NPDES permit, issued by IDEM and approved by the
EPA.55 As a result, BP could begin to degrade the water quality of
Lake Michigan.5 6 Although the first and most notable goal of the
particularly, at 0.0018 g/l and 510 g/l respectively, for drinking water), with
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 302.208 (setting numeric water quality standard
for the protection of human health, for mercury and benzene particularly, at
0.012 ug/1 and 310 ug/1 respectively). Illinois does not set forth a distinction
between drinking water and non-drinking water. Id.
51. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 1. BP's planned facility modification
was necessary for it to process Canadian Extra Heavy Crude Oil. Id.
52. Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 1. While BP explained that efforts to
refine Canadian oil would have positive effects for the public, its negative
effects were embodied in the increased discharges allowed under its renewed
NPDES permit. Id.
53. Id. Indiana State officials stressed that BP's facility expansion would
provide 2,000 temporary construction jobs and eighty permanent jobs at the
Whiting, Indiana refinery. Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 1. At the time BP
sought to renew its NPDES permit in anticipation of facility expansion, the
refinery employed 1,300 people. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 34, at 1.
54. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(2); 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1-2. Indiana State
officials' declarations that 2,000 temporary construction jobs and eighty
permanent jobs would be created as a result of a $3.8 billion expansion is
evidently the social and economic development of benefit to the area that
justified the degradation of Lake Michigan. 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 5-2-11.7
(2007). It must be emphasized that because Lake Michigan is a Tier III water,
under applicable Indiana law, it must be maintained and protected in its
present high quality without degradation. 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1.5-4; BP
Fact Sheet, supra note 34, at 2.
However, the fact sheet prepared by IDEM and made available on its
website explains that increased discharges of pollutants by BP would be
permitted if "the action responsible for the increased discharge ... provides
social or economic benefits to the area in which the discharge occurs .... " BP
Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 16-17. This Comment considers Section 131.12
(and Indiana's version) together with Section 5-2-11.7 of Indiana's
Administrative Code antidegradation implementation procedures provision
because the above-quoted language is similar to that used in Section 131.12,
Title 40 of the Federal Code of Regulations antidegradation policy.
55. BP Permit, supra note 5; see also BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 6
(explaining that review and approval of the final permit by U.S. EPA Region
Five was required because BP's facility was subject to federal effluent
guidelines in addition to Indiana guidelines).
56. BP had submitted its application for a renewed NPDES permit in
contemplation of modifying its facility. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31. BP's
expansion project will be finished in 2011. Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 1.
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CWA is to eliminate the pollution of U.S. waters, 57 BP's NPDES
permit allows BP to circumvent this goal and increase its
58
discharge of pollution into Lake Michigan.

III. THE ANTIDEGRADATION POLICY AS A TOOL USED TO
FRUSTRATE THE CWA's ULTIMATE GOAL

This section examines the way in which technical compliance
with the CWA and State law may be accomplished through the use
of exceptions within the law itself. Particularly, the exception to
the antidegredation policy contained within the Indiana
Administrative Code and the CWA has been invoked in BP's
59
situation to renew its NPDES permit.
Although case law provides some discussion on the
antidegradation exception, it does so within the context of broader
issues and without a detailed analysis of the exception itself.s o
Nevertheless, case law illustrates the proper framework in which
to
consider
the
antidegradation
exception
specifically.
Furthermore, the analysis here must examine the public's
response to BP's renewal NPDES permit and the effect that
response has had on BP, IDEM, and the EPA.61 The public's
response highlights the conflict between the CWA's policies
generally, the antidegradation policy specifically, and EPA-State
cooperation.
A. BP Legally Renewed its NPDES Permit
Once BP determined that its planned refinery expansion
would necessitate an increase of pollutant discharges into Lake
Michigan, 62 it properly notified IDEM to begin the permit renewal

57. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
58. See Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 23 (alerting people to the fact that BP
was allowed to increase the amount of pollution it would discharge into Lake
Michigan because "[a] rarely invoked [Indiana] law trumps anti-pollution
rules if a company offers 'important social or economic benefits"'); contra
Posting of Commissioner Thomas W. Easterly's Comments on BP's Permit to
IDEM, http://www.in.gov/idem/ (July 20, 2007) (last visited on Nov. 2, 2008)
[hereinafter Easterly's Comments] ("IDEM has provided no exceptions to
environmental conditions for this [BP] facility. The wastewater treatment
permit meets all state laws and regulations that apply to the facility and
project.").
59. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Ala. Dep't of Env'tl. Mgmt. v. Legal Env't Assistance Found.,
Inc., 922 So. 2d 101, 113-14 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (involving consideration of
how the Alabama Department of Environmental Management works under
the state law to ensure its compliance with the CWA).
61. See Hawthorne, supra note 1 (noting the public's response to BP's new
project, and how that response has affected BP, the EPA, and IDEM).
62. See BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31 (explaining BP's application for
renewal of its NPDES permit following the decision to modify its refinery).

The Clean Water Act's DegradationPolicy

2008]

process.

63

1. BP began its renewal applicationprocess in compliance with
IDEM mandates64 and the CWA 6 5
As a threshold matter, BP had to show compliance with
effluent limitations provided by IDEM.66 In a letter released a
month after the renewal permit was issued, IDEM reiterated that
BP had to prove its compliance with certain effluent limitations
that were higher than those set by federal law. 67 Where BP could
not immediately comply with some of those proposed limitations in
the renewed permit, it was given a schedule of compliance of three
years. 68 Additionally, BP was given three months from the
effective date of the permit to begin monitoring the designated
parameters. 69 At the end of the renewal permit application
process, BP was able to show that compliance with effluent
BP's
limitations would be forthcoming, if not immediate.7 0
63. See CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 44 (discussing the application
process for NPDES permits as generally requiring 180 days prior to
commencement of discharge); see also BP Fact Sheet, supra note 34, at 2
(providing March 2007 as the date of fact sheet publication which signified
that BP had successfully applied for its renewal NPDES permit prior to that
date).
64. See ADLER, supra note 13, at 166-68 (explaining that state NPDES

permit programs, even if federally authorized, were not necessarily in line
with the CWA and that inadequacies of some state programs were resolved by
litigation).

65. Although Section III(A)(1) addresses the way in which BP has
technically complied with the relevant provisions of the CWA and Indiana
environmental law, it also highlights how "exceptions" to those laws exist to
render compliance. See infra notes 82, 89.
66. See BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 6 (explaining that BP's NPDES
permit limits would be based upon the most stringent of (1) technology-based
limitations, (2) best professional judgment, or (3) Indiana Water QualityBased Effluent Limitations).
67. Easterly's Comments, supra note 58; see BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31,
at 6 (explaining that because BP discharges into Lake Michigan, it is subject
to the specific guidelines for Great Lakes system dischargers). In BP's
situation, Indiana does have stricter standards than federal law, but
elsewhere that may not be the situation. When state legislatures recognize
that industries shop around for the least restrictive state environmental laws,
legislatures may respond by minimizing state environmental agencies' ability
to compel environmental regulations. Organ, supra note 10, at 1388-89. It is
questionable whether such state legislative action impairs the ultimate goals
of the CWA.
68. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 12. There are so many individual
permits under the NPDES permit program that it is nearly impossible to
review each permit to determine whether dischargers are in compliance and
violations likely go unnoticed. ADLER, supra note 13, at 151. "Serious
problems" exist with the permit program so that the CWA is likely not
implemented properly. Id.
69. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 12.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 (explaining that BP was
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situation aside, the initial requirement of proving compliance with
proposed effluent limitations under the CWA has proven
71
successful to a degree.
Because BP was not able to ensure compliance with proposed
effluent limitations in certain areas of Lake Michigan, it
submitted an alternate mixing zone demonstration.7 2 A mixing
zone is "a limited area or volume of water where initial dilution of
a discharge takes place." 73 Pursuant to the CWA, and at Indiana's
discretion, 74 BP was allowed a mixing zone because it had ensured
that the zone would not adversely affect drinking water or
interfere with aquatic life. 75 The alternate mixing zone allowed
"limited violations '76 of BP's NPDES permit "in the immediate
vicinity of. [an] outfall." 77 The justification for mixing zone
''exceptions" is that they are "one way of using dilution and other
factors to change the stringency with which water quality criteria
78s
are translated into enforceable permit limits.
Once the application was deemed complete, IDEM prepared a
draft permit and fact sheet, 79 publicizing both documents in March

complying with IDEM and CWA mandates when it began its renewal
application). As to water pollution legislation generally, meeting deadlines in
a timely manner has often not been a high priority; the list of missed
deadlines is long. Murchison, supra note 16, at 593.
71. "The reduction in discharges from point sources has been substantial."
Murchison, supra note 16, at 578. The article follows this up by mentioning
that the ultimate goal of the CWA is not being achieved. Id. at 579.
72. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 2; see, e.g., 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1-4
(2007) (detailing mixing zones guidelines generally).
73. See ADLER, supra note 13, at 161 (explaining mixing zones); CWA
HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39 (same).
74. See Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 23 (reporting that Indiana regulators
granted BP the first-ever exemption to create a mixing zone in order to dilute
pollution).
75. See BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 3 (explaining that BP's alternate
mixing zone, in accordance with IND. ADMIN. CODE SECTION 5-2-11.4(b)(4)
(2007), was proven not to cause any of the listed adverse impacts); contra
Hawthorne, supra note 1 (reporting that there is a push to eliminate use of
mixing zones because they threaten humans, fish, and wildlife).
76. ADLER, supra note 13, at 161.
77. Id. This presents yet another "exception" to the CWA's "zero discharge"
goal. See supra note 34 (discussing failures to achieve the zero discharge
goal); Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 10, at 863 (discussing zero discharge
goal and how the EPA attempts to achieve it). This mixing zone alternative
within the CWA was "actively encouraged" by the EPA at earlier times.
ADLER, supra note 13, at 161. Those in favor of mixing zones are said to
"[trivialize] the zero discharge philosophy of the CWA, as well as the goal of no
toxics in toxic amounts." Id. Today, the EPA tends to discourage use of
mixing zones. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 40.
78. ADLER, supra note 13, at 161-62.
79. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 1. This Comment uses the Fact Sheet
in part to determine BP's compliance with the CWA.
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BP therefore conformed with the further requirement of
providing an opportunity for public participation in the NPDES
renewal process.81 In response to the draft permit, forty-six people
provided comments to IDEM during the comment period.8 2 This
public comment period served the dual purposes of ensuring
for appeal in the
compliance with the law and preserving 8issues
3
challenged.
was
permit
NPDES
event BP's
The initial steps BP took to renew its NPDES permit, in
contemplation of facility expansion, were in substantial
compliance with Indiana environmental law and the CWA.
However, pollutant dischargers, such as BP, may benefit from the
exceptions 8 4 to the CWA's basic prohibition8 5 in reaching those
levels of compliance.8 6 In successfully renewing its NPDES permit,
shield."8 7
"permit
a
with
provided
been
has
BP
2007.80

2. IDEM invoked a "rarelyinvoked"8 8 exception to the CWA's
antidegradationpolicy8 9 in contravention of the CWA's ultimate
goals
Although Section 1251 of the CWA states that "it is the
national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters be eliminated by 1985," 90 Section 5-2-11.3, Title 327 of the
Indiana Administrative Code permits additional discharge given
sufficient justification. 91 IDEM overcame the obvious conflict

80. Id.
81. See 40 C.F.R. § 124.10 (2007) (describing public notice requirements).
82. BP Refinery Fact Sheet, http://www.in.gov/idem/files/bp-factsheet.pdf.
The opinions expressed by those forty-six people do not appear on the BP
Refinery Fact Sheet. Id.
83. See 40 C.F.R. § 124.13 (2007) (describing the obligation to raise issues
and provide information during public comment period); see also CWA
HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 47 (summarizing public comment/hearing
requirement).
84. "There are, of course, exceptions to the Act's basic prohibition." Van
Putten & Jackson, supra note 10, at 874.
85. Id.
86. Exceptions applicable to point sources have increased water-quality
related problems. Murchison, supra note 16, at 592.
87. A "permit shield" is a considerable benefit to permittees because it
shields them from meeting more stringent limitations that the EPA may later
promulgate. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 53.
88. Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 23.
89. This Comment discusses the exemption granted to BP from the
perspective of the antidegradation implementation procedures provision
contained in 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 5-2-11.7, as well as the antidegradation
policy contained in 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1-2.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
91. 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 5-2-11.3 (2007). BP has to comply with Section
5-2-11.3 of the Indiana Administrative Code because the discharges will be
into Lake Michigan.

The John Marshall Law Review

[42:209

between the CWA's ultimate goal and Indiana's Section 5-2-11.7
antidegradation
implementation
procedures
through
the
justifications it set forth.
BP's initial submission of its antidegradation analysis was
not adequate according to IDEM.92 Thereafter, IDEM determined
BP sufficiently justified the degradation of Lake Michigan by
satisfying a number of factors.9 3 The exact determinations of
specific factors were not provided in the IDEM fact sheet
disseminated to the public pursuant to Section 1342 of the CWA. 94
Although IDEM was required to consider both the positive and
negative social and economic consequences of BP's proposed
pollutant discharges, two positive consequences were released to
the public by Indiana State officials. 95 Furthermore, the fact sheet
itself only provided: "[BP's antidegradation demonstration]... that
the action responsible for the increased discharge of ammonia
provides social or economic benefits to the area in which the
discharge occurs has been made." 96
B. Case Law Avoids the Troubled Waters of the Antidegradation
Policy Exception's Effect on the CWA's Ultimate Goal
1.

The antidegradationpolicy's exception can be manipulated by
the States

9 7
In Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus,
the Ohio court
recognized that the state legislation stood in complete contrast to
the federal antidegradation policy by allowing degradation without
public participation or even consideration of economic and social
need. 98 The Ohio legislature had enacted its antidegradation
policy including the provision that "the director [of environmental
protection] may allocate to existing sources eighty percent of the
pollutant assimilative capacity.. .without further antidegradation
review." 99 What the State antidegradation provision did, in effect,
was preclude the public from being given notice and from being
afforded a hearing prior to degradation activity. 0 0 To allow the

92. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 15.
93. See 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 5-2-11.7 (listing considerations used to

determine compliance with CWA when water quality degradation is
permitted).
94. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 1.
BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 16-17.
86 Ohio Misc. 2d 78 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1995).
Id. at 92.
Id. at 88 (quoting Baldwin's Ohio Revised Code Annotated, OHIO REV.

CODE ANN. § 6111.12 (West 2008)) (emphasis added in Rivers Unlimited).

100. Rivers Unlimited, 86 Ohio Misc. 2d at 93. This is in violation of the
CWA which requires both notice and hearing prior to degradation. 40 C.F.R.
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State's antidegradation policy to stand would allow frustration of
102
1
the CWA's ultimate goals. 1 The legislation was held invalid.
In Ex parte Fowl River ProtectionAssociation, Inc. v. Board of
Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile, 10 3 the
Alabama court agreed with the plaintiffs challenging the State's
interpretation of its antidegradation policy, holding the
The Alabama
interpretation a violation of the policy. 10 4
Environmental Management Commission ("AEMC") determined
that the State's antidegradation policy would apply only to waters
of higher quality than the public water supply. 0 5 Because the
Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM")
did not rate any waters as higher in quality than the public water
supply, the antidegradation policy would not apply to any water in
06
the State.
In another Ohio case, Columbus and Franklin County
Metropolitan Park District v. Shank, 0 7 the Court determined that
("OEPA")
Agency's
Protection
Ohio
Environmental
the
interpretation would "eviscerate" the State's antidegradation
policy because "it allows a clear degradation of water quality to be
considered nondegradation."' 08 The OEPA attempted to argue
that the State's antidegradation policy permitted deterioration of
water quality at point sources short of interference with the
The Court explained that OEPA's
designated use. 10 9
interpretation conflicted with federal law and that the latter
required procedural safeguards before any amount of degradation
could occur." 0
In all three cases, the courts recognized the inconsistencies
between State interpretation of the CWA's antidegradation policy
exception and the policy exception itself, holding the
interpretations invalid. But, the courts did not address whether

§ 131.12 (2007).
101. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2007); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (explaining that

Congress's goal under the CWA is to restore and maintain the nation's
waters).
102. Rivers Unlimited, 86 Ohio Misc. 2d at 93.
103. 572 So. 2d 446 (Ala. 1990).
104. Id. at 455. The Court explained that at a "practical level," the AEMC's
determination allowed for degradation of all state water because none of them
came within the antidegradation policy's application. Id. at 453.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 600 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio 1992).
108. Id. at 1056.
109. Id. at 1054.
110. Id. at 1055 (emphasis added). OEPA interpreted the policy so that
satisfaction of procedural requirements under the CWA would be unnecessary
in certain situations. Id. The Court explained that "degradation" meant "any
perceptible decrease in water quality," and not just changes short of
interference with the designated use. Id.
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the presence of the antidegradation policy (with the degradation
exception) was itself the problem.'1 1
3. Courts are unwilling to interfere with economic determinations
made under the CWA's antidegradationpolicy
The antidegradation policy exception to the CWA explicitly
provides that States must consider what types of "economic or
social development"' 12 will result if degradation is allowed by a
discharger. When determinations are based, in part, on economic
considerations under the antidegradation exception, courts remain
11 3
deferential to the States' determinations.
In Alabama Department of Environmental Management v.
Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation,Inc., 114 the Alabama
court emphasized the judiciary's hands-off approach towards
evaluating economic policy in the context of state environmental
law. 115 In the end, "ADEM... [had the] plenary power to manage
the delicate balance between the economy and the environment of
116
Alabama."
There is a possibility that insufficient justifications for
degradation will be upheld as valid. The question remains
whether such justifications will be sufficient if courts engage in
closer scrutiny of them.

111. See supra notes 99-1120 and accompanying text (discussing the
relevant case law); see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, New Sources, New Growth and
the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 651, 684 (2004) (concluding that the EPA
and States appear willing to limit antidegradation review which will mean
discharges that result in significant degradation); Van Putten & Jackson,
supra note 10, at 888, 891 (discussing anti-backsliding rule's exception as
swallowing the actual rule and equating the exception with a "loophole" that
ultimately undermines the CWA).
The States' interpretations of their
antidegradation policies (and attendant exceptions) can be seen as exceptions
to exceptions.
112. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2007).
113. See Murchison, supra note 16, at 583-84 (explaining that cost-benefit
analysis in environmental regulation context is objectionable and that U.S.
water pollution law has preference for degradation prevention only when the
larger economic system will not be damaged by such prevention).
114. 922 So. 2d 101 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
115. Id. at 113. The Court went further:
ADEM must have discretion to decide whether, at some level, the "needs
of the people" of Alabama will be better served by placing upper limits
upon the costs of permit applicants' industrial plants and equipment
than by requiring massive and inefficient expenditures from those
applicants in order to achieve marginal improvements in water quality.

Id.
116. Id.
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C. Public Outcry Cannot Prevent Degradationof
Lake Michigan and U.S. Waters
The CWA has served to preclude 1 7 the public from legally
challenging 118 BP's renewal permit because BP has not actually
violated the CWA or Indiana environmental law. 11 9 While reports
of BP's renewal permit (containing Lake Michigan degradation
approval) were at their height in early August 2007, the EPA
insisted it had no authority to rescind the permit.1 20 People,
including Congressional members, celebrities, and the general
public, attempted to persuade IDEM and the EPA to reconsider
the permit.121 The result was that BP agreed it would comply with
the previous, more stringent permit limits. 1 22
The fact is that BP's renewal permit remains effective.
"Frequently, some environmental mishap serves [the] function" of
convincing regulators that statutory and regulatory reform is
necessary.1 23 Here, BP itself, not regulators, agreed to comply
with previous, more stringent permit limits in response to public
dissatisfaction and fortunately did not do so because of some
environmental mishap.

117. Contrary to the CWA's application in the BP situation, Congress
intended that the public voice be heard loudly and clearly in its efforts to
ensure CWA compliance. "Congress also turned to ordinary citizens to help
ensure that the EPA would have the motivation necessary to establish a
credible and vigorous enforcement program." Andreen, supra note 15, at 260.
118. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (listing situations in which a citizen suit may
commence).
119. Indiana provided notice and hearing prior to its and the EPA's approval
of BP's renewal permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3); see also BP Refinery Fact
Sheet, supra note 832 (listing notice, hearing, comment, final permit issuance,
and appeal period termination dates); Easterly's Comments, supra note 58
(explaining that Indiana cooperated with the EPA during BP's NPDES permit
renewal application process to ensure compliance with the CWA).
120. Hawthorne, supra note 11, at 1.
121. See Michael Hawthorne, BP Says It Won't Increase Pollution, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 24, 2007, § 1, at 1 (explaining that City of Chicago Mayor Richard
Daley and Eddie Vedder of Pearl Jam were among those voicing their
opposition to BP's renewal permit and its attendant Lake Michigan
degradation allowance).
122. Id.
123. Murchison, supra note 16, at 585. The author states:
In the United States, neither an organized environmental movement nor
a gradually worsening environmental problem has been sufficient to
produce significant statutory and regulatory reform. This seems to
require some external event to convince the relevant political groups
that change is required.
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IV. CLOSING THE ANTIDEGRADATION POLICY'S LOOPHOLE

The CWA's ultimate goal of clean water is undercut by its
own antidegradation policy. 124 This policy plays an essential role
in the overall scheme of the CWA;125 it prohibits water quality
degradation absent certain conditions. 126 Rather than allowing for
degradation when "necessary to accommodate important economic
or social development,"' 127 social considerations must be balanced
directly against economic considerations.
A. Expand Notice to a GreaterPortion of the Public so that
Social Considerationsare Adequately Accounted For
Throughout the CWA, beginning with its very first section,
the public is encouraged, directed, and expected to take an active
role under it.128 Furthermore, Section 1365 authorizes, and in
part depends upon, citizen lawsuits in a number of situations in
1 29
order to achieve the CWA's ultimate goals.
BP's situation, however, represents the way in which the
public notice and hearing requirements under the CWA are
unsatisfactory. Title 40, Section 124.10 provides a list of ways in
which public notice of permit actions can be achieved, and Indiana
likely complied with those suggestions. 130
Yet, the public's
response to Indiana's approval of BP's renewal NPDES permit
shows that a greater portion of the public must receive notice and
an opportunity for hearing than did in that situation.
Lake Michigan is not confined to Northwest Indiana where

124. Contra Gaba, supra note 113, at 693 (explaining that the tools available
for achieving success under the CWA are the same today as they were when
the CWA was first enacted and that fault lies with the people and not with the
statute).
125. The EPA has acknowledged this, stating that the "antidegradation
policy is significantly underused as a tool to attain and maintain water quality
and plan for and channel important economic and social development that can
impact water quality." Id. at 671 (quoting Water Quality Standards
Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,780 (July 7, 1998) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 131)).
126. Those conditions being, of course, "important economic or social
development in the area in which the waters are located." 40 C.F.R. § 131.12
(2007).
127. Id.
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e). When it comes to NPDES permits specifically,
Section 1342 reiterates that the public is to be given "notice of each application
for a permit" and provided "an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling
on each such application." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3).

129. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
130. See 40 C.F.R. 124.10 (2007) (explaining how a state agency should
compile a mailing list and how to notify people as to whether they wish to be
on the mailing list in order for the state agency to comply with notice
requirement). IDEM provided notice and hearing in March and April of 2007
respectively. BP Refinery Fact Sheet, supra note 83, at 1.
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BP's facility stands. Those that use Lake Michigan are not just
those within that area. The city of Chicago is a few miles away
from BP's facility and uses Lake Michigan for numerous things,
including drinking water. 131 At the very least, the "public" that
should have been notified of BP's renewal NPDES application
should have consisted of Whiting, Indiana 132 residents, as well as
133
Chicago residents.
Given the nature of U.S. waters, the public that will be
affected by any adverse actions taken will consist of more people
than those local to the pollutant dischargers. Given the nature of
the CWA's goals, public notice and hearing must be expanded in
order for those goals to have an increased likelihood of success.
B. Reduce Excessive Deference to Economic Considerations
By balancing social considerations directly against economic
ones, economic considerations will still be adequately measured
while not to the exclusion of social ones. As evidenced by Alabama
Department of Environmental Management, 3 courts remain very
deferential to economic considerations and the context of
135
environmental legislation provides no exception.
It should be presumed that when contemplating a proposed
NPDES permit application, the public and state environmental
officials should consider economic benefits and detriments as part
of their "social" consideration. In doing so, it will be more difficult
for state environmental officials to ultimately determine that
economic considerations outweigh social ones.
The apparent willingness courts and state environmental
officials have to find adequate economic considerations, in order to
degrade water quality, stems from their focus on economic benefits
131. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing the many states
that benefit from Lake Michigan).
132. The BP refinery is located there. BP Fact Sheet, supra note 341, at 1.
133. Hawthorne, supra note 10, at 1. The public in the City of Chicago was
notified too late. They voiced their opposition once it was reported that BP's
application for renewal had been approved. Id. See Gaba, supra note 113, at
684 (noting that there is nothing more frightening to a pollutant discharger
than the possibility of public hearing); Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 1
(reporting that renewal NPDES permit was approved and in effect).
134. 922 So. 2d at 113. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text
(discussing the Alabama court's deference towards economic policy within the
context of the CWA).
135. The Alabama court emphasized that:
In enacting the [Alabama Environmental Management Act], the
Legislature charged ADEM with the responsibility not only of
'administering environmental legislation,' but also of 'promoting
economy and efficiency in the operation and management of
environmental programs.'
Ala. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 922 So. 2d at 113 (quoting ALA. CODE § 22-22A2(1)(1975).
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to the exclusion of economic detriments. 136 Closer scrutiny of the
economic detriments that follow from water pollution, however,
reveal that the CWA's antidegradation policy serves an important
role economically and socially in restricting water quality
degradation. 137 This highlights the need to restrict the deference
accorded positive economic determinations when it comes to
allowing degradation under the CWA.
It cannot be denied that economic considerations must be
made when granting or denying pollutant dischargers NPDES
permits. 38
However, extreme deference towards economic
determinations, particularly positive economic determinations,
often forecloses adequate consideration of social factors. Directly
balancing social considerations against economic ones minimizes
the opportunity for courts and state environmental officials to
determine that sufficient economic considerations in favor of
degradation have been shown.
C. Fully Define "ImportantEconomic or Social Development"
The antidegradation policy's exception, allowing for lower
water quality when "necessary to accommodate important
economic or social development,"13 9 remains unclear in its

136. The Alabama court discusses the "massive and inefficient expenditures"
that would have to be made by NPDES permit applicants to ensure
antidegradation and the "marginal improvements in water quality" if
antidegradation policy was enforced. Id. Yet, the court fails to consider what
the situation may be once those initial expenditures have been made by the
applicant and whether marginal improvements in water quality may have
eventually added up to significant improvements given time. Id. By
seemingly limiting its review of ADEM's decision to allow or prevent
degradation to the immediate future, the court may have overlooked the
possibility that economic losses may eventually follow degradation.
In BP's situation, the focus was on the temporary construction jobs and
eighty permanent jobs that would result from refinery facility expansion.
Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 1. The economic losses that may eventually
follow from allowing water quality degradation were not made known. See BP
Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 16-17 (summarizing that economic and social
benefits would follow allowing facility expansion and attendant water quality
degradation).
137. The most obvious economic losses as a result of water pollution are
experienced by commercial fisheries.
ADLER, supra note 36, at 97.
Contamination of drinking water supplies means increased treatment costs.
Id. at 98. The economic losses resulting from lost recreational opportunities
due to water pollution are hard to quantify. Id. at 100. And finally, human
illnesses suffered as a result of polluted waters means healthcare costs and
loss of work force productivity. Id. at 97.
138. It has even been suggested that experimentation with economic
incentives may be a way in which to persuade parties to comply with water
quality standards so that they will refrain from seeking out approval for water
quality degradation. Murchison, supra note 16, at 597.
139. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2007).
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application on a case-by-case basis. In order to properly balance
social factors against economic factors, there must be better
guidance available as to how to consider each part of that phrase.
In BP's situation, IDEM did not specifically report how BP
met its burden under the antidegradation policy, only that it did in
fact do so. 140 The provision of the Indiana Administrative Code,
which IDEM likely used to determine whether BP set forth
sufficient justification for water quality degradation, contains a
long list of criteria to consider.141 Regardless of how thorough that
list of criteria may be, the public fallout following IDEM's approval
of BP's renewal permit, and degradation permission, illustrates
that the list of criteria must be further defined.
Throughout the decades, attention has been paid to the
uncertain phrase allowing water degradation when "necessary to
accommodate important economic or social development."1 42 The
focus has often been upon the term "important."1 4 3 But, it has
been further suggested that the substantive elements of that
phrase also remain unclear. 144 The antidegradation policy means
that "[i]n no case may water quality be degraded without adequate
justification in countervailing societal and economic interests that
outweigh the degradation."1 45 But, that sentence lacks conviction
140. See BP Fact Sheet, supra note 31, at 16-17 (summarizing that BP
showed economic and social benefits to be derived from increased discharge
limits). The Chicago Tribune reported that BP met its burden under the
antidegradation policy, in order to be granted an exemption from that policy,
because its refinery facility expansion would "create more jobs and 'increase
the diversity and security of oil supplies to the Midwestern United States."'
Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 23.
141. See 327 IND. ADMIN. CODE 5-2-11.3 (2007) (directing consideration of
the unemployment rate in the area, the increase in employment at the facility
following degradation allowance, the increased tax revenues if degradation is
allowed, and the increased risk to human health as a result of degradation
allowance, among other criteria).
142. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (2007).
143. See Columbus & Franklin County Metro. Park Dist., 600 N.E. 2d at
1075 (discussing the EPA's decision to change "significant" to "important" in
the antidegradation policy's exception in order to strengthen the intent of
protecting higher quality waters). But see Van Putten & Jackson, supra note
10, at 899 (explaining that the EPA intended "important" to be a relative term
and that the "significance" of degradation should be considered in defining the
term).
144. See Gaba, supra note 113, at 692 (advocating that the substantive
elements justifying degradation need clarification). This suggestion is in
response to confusion and controversy created by the antidegradation policy.
Id. One noted option, rather extreme, that is available to the EPA is to
"abandon any pretense that the antidegradation policy imposes a substantive
limit on a state's ability to allow degradation of water quality." Id. at 692-93.
To do so, however, would remove the obstacle pollutant dischargers must
overcome in order to degrade water quality. In other words, to abandon the
"pretense" would be to nullify the antidegradation policy. Id.
145. Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 10, at 899.
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without further elaboration of parts of the policy. In the end, the
antidegradation policy, "important... in implementing the
[CWA's] goal of continued progress towards eliminating pollutant
discharges,"14 6 is written too generally.
V.

CONCLUSION

The CWA was enacted initially because of an overriding
interest the U.S. had in the protection and preservation of its
waters. Its antidegradation policy is a further safeguard of that
overriding interest. The policy's exception as it now exists,
therefore, seriously threatens the progress towards the CWA's
ultimate goals.
The antidegradation policy, specifically its
exception, must be altered and further defined for it to have its
intended effect upon pollutant dischargers and U.S. waters. BP's
situation is only one example of the way in which the
antidegradation policy may not suffice. This begs the question:
has the CWA's antidegradation policy, in fact, been dumped?

146. Id.

